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INVESTIGATION OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN 
THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
John A. Sautter* & Levente Littvay** 
Political ideology has long been associated with the manner in 
which judges make judicial decisions. Extensive empirical research has 
established the link between a judge s political ideology and how they 
rule on cases. However, little research has been conducted specifically in 
environmental law. Indeed, what research is available looks at environ-
mental law in general and has not asked any questions concerning how 
political ideology might affect decision-making concerning specific 
environmental statutes. This article seeks to partially fill this void by 
looking specifically at how political ideology affects whether judges 
affirm or reverse agency action with respect to the Clean Water Act versus 
the Clean Air Act. The data used in this analysis were collected from 
seventy environmental law cases, which include 116 instances of statutory 
interpretation and 347 judicial votes concerning cases appealed to the U.S. 
Courts of Appeal over a three-year period from 2003 to 2005. Findings 
indicate that political ideology is a much more important factor in Clean 
Water Act cases as compared to Clean Air Act cases. Furthermore, evidence 
shows that panel composition was much more important for Clean Water 
Act decisions as opposed to Clean Air Act decisions. These findings are 
placed within the genera/framework of understanding legal decisions as 
a product of both legal interpretation and political preferences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While there have been tremendous strides in using empirical 
methods to understand legal decisions made by courts, there have 
been very few empirical studies of environmental case law. 1 In all 
of the empirical studies on the subject, environmental statutes have 
essentially been treated as interchangeable.2 That is, researchers 
have treated environmental statutes as essentially different objects 
of the same kind.3 However, this poses the question of whether there 
are differences in the way judges treat specific environmental law 
statutes. This article investigates the differences between the manner 
in which federal appellate judges treat Clean Air Act ("CAA") and 
Clean Water Act ("CWA") cases when deciding to affirm or reverse 
agency decisions.4 For the purposes of this article this is referred 
to as "statutory context." In particular, the article addresses the 
issue of whether political ideology increases a judge's probability 
of supporting an agency's action under the CAA or the CWA.5 In 
1 For some of the most important see Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to 
Precedent, 2 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 369, 403-04 (2005); Frank B. Cross & Emerson 
H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblow-
ing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155,2172 (1998); Jason J. 
Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investiga-
tion of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 860 (2006); Andrew P. Morriss, 
Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Signaling and Precedent in Federal District 
Court Opinions, 13 SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 63, 64-65 (2005); Gregory C. Sisk, Mi-
chael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Irifluences on the Judicial Mind: 
An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1382-83, 
1410 (1998). See also Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
383, 394,409-10 (2007). 
2 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. 
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa 
Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Prelimi-
nary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REv. 301, 322 (2004); Thomas J. Miles & Cass 
R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of 
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 847-65 (2006). 
3 What little empirical work that has been done on environmental law has not dis-
tinguished between the manner in which judges treat statutes. 
4 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2011); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401-7671(q) (2011). 
5 It is important to note that in this investigation there is no consideration of a 
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posing this question other variables like judicial collegiality or the 
political diversity of a bench also are explored. These variables are 
important in understanding how the statutory context might activate 
or obviate certain characteristics of a sitting bench. 
As an empirical analysis, this article focuses on statistical 
analysis of 116 instances of judicial review of an agency action 
in environmental law between 2003 and 2005. This equates to 
34 7 judicial votes concerning an agency action in regard to an 
environmental statute. The cases used in this data set only concern 
instances of judicial review of agency interpretation of a statute.6 
Federal circuit courts either voted to affirm or reverse the agency 
action. The data set includes cases from every circuit court of appeals 
except the Third Circuit. Statistical results of this data indicate a 
number of important findings. 
First, political preferences matter.7 The general salience 
of political ideology in judicial decisions supports a long line of 
research that has found similar results. 8 Particular to this analysis, 
ideology is an important factor in CWA cases as opposed to CAA 
cases and other less litigated environmental statutes. In regard to 
the CWA, liberals were much more likely to reverse agency action 
as compared to conservatives. In contrast, no significant bifurcation 
along ideological lines existed in CAA cases. 
liberal or conservative vote, but only of whether the judges supported the agency 
action in question. Cj, Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, 
and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997) (uses a dependent variable 
based upon coding of the decisions being pro-industry or pro-environment). 
6 Using only cases of judicial review of agency action avoids judges being able to 
use other legal doctrines, like standing, to dispose of a potential statutory interpre-
tation issue. For more explanation on this, see Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical 
Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chev-
ron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U.CoLO. L. REv. 767, at 772. 
7 As one commentator noted, "[J]udges' decisions are a function of what they 
prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but constrained by 
what they perceive is feasible to do." Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The 
Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. 
L. REv. 841, at 841 (2006). 
8 See, Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 2, at 322-23 ("From 1970 through 
2002, Democratic appointees voted against agency challenges [sixty-four per-
cent] of the time, whereas Republican appointees did so [forty-six percent] of the 
time."). 
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Another important set of findings concerns statutory 
context and judicial collegiality - defined here as having two or 
more justices on the bench of the same political ideology - which 
had altering effects in both CAA and CWA cases. 9 In CWA cases, 
conservatives were much more likely to affirm when there was 
another conservative on the bench with them, both as compared to 
other environmental law statutes and when estimated independently 
on only CWA cases. Conversely, in CAA opinions, liberals were 
more likely to reverse agency rulings when there was another liberal 
on the bench with them. However, unlike the CWA cases, this effect 
was not significant when an independent estimation of only CAA 
cases was used. 
Finally, this article also looks at the manner in which political 
diversity of a bench affects agency review and statutory context.10 
Political diversity of a bench measures the average distance between 
judges on the "conservative to liberal" ideological spectrum. 
Analysis of the data from this study shows that more ideological 
diversity on a bench led to a significantly higher likelihood that the 
judges would reverse the agency decision in CWA decisions. This 
trend was absent among CAA cases. 
These findings suggest that there are major differences in the 
manner in which judges approach the CWAas compared to the CAA. 
However, there are no clear answers as to why CWA cases should be 
so much more politicized than CAA cases. The final section assesses 
the potential reasons for these differences. 
I. WHY LOOK AT ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION? 
Statutory context is an important question to address in 
environmental law generally. Understanding how judges react to 
specific environmental provisions can inform the legislative branch 
9 In this article the definition of collegiality by Revesz is used. Richard L. Revesz, 
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 
(1997). 
10 Although somewhat different, the political diversity construct is similar to that 
used by Czarnezki and Ford. See Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The 
Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. 
L. REv. 841, at 841 (2006). 
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of the potential secondary effects of their choice of words and 
statutory content. These questions are also important to litigators. 
Statutory context could mean using different arguments or legal 
strategies in arguing an environmental case before a court. Finally, 
differences in how judges treat environmental statutes can be an 
important element for administrative agencies that must defend their 
interpretation of the statute. Knowing that one statute will arouse 
political ideology in the judiciary as compared to another could 
affect the way that the agency fulfills its mandate under the law or 
the way it interprets the statutory provisions. 
A. The Environmental Law Context 
Environmental statutes tend to be as complex as the 
environment they protect. 11 These laws are sprinkled with statutory 
mandates concerning hard science, geography, risk assessment and 
the public welfare. Agencies promulgate regulations, devise policy 
and take actions based on the way that they interpret these statutes. 
When these actions are challenged, the agency must defend its 
statutory interpretation in the courts. Judges hearing environmental 
cases must then apply the Chevron Doctrine to decide whether the 
agency appropriately interpreted Congress's intent. 12 
The Chevron decision is the most cited court case in all 
of American law.13 The precedent calls upon a court to ask two 
questions. First, did Congress speak directly to the issue at hand in 
the statute?14 Second, if Congress left ambiguity in the statute was 
11 For a basic synopsis of environmental case law that captures the intricacies 
and history of the subject, see RoBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. ScHROEDER, 
ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
PoLicY (5th ed. 2006). 
12 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
13 PERCIVAL, SCHROEDER, MILLER & LEAPE, supra note 11. 
14 See id at 843 n.9. "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory con-
struction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear 
congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, 
that intention is the law and must be given effect." 
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the agency's interpretation of the statute reasonable?15 If a court 
finds that the agency action was reasonable, then it should defer to 
the expertise of the agency in the particular area being litigated.16 
Judicial interpretation of agency action leaves much room 
for individual judges to potentially apply their own preferencesY 
Previous findings have supported this contention. 18 However, 
though judges can rule that the statute is ambiguous, they tend to 
defer to agency judgment in a majority of environmental law cases, 
roughly sixty percent of the time. 19 Past studies have indicated that 
political ideology has been an important factor in judicial review of 
agency action concerning environmental statutes on a statistically 
significant level. 20 None of these researchers looked into specific 
differences regarding statutes.21 Thus, the absence of research in this 
area begs the question of whether the statutory context does make a 
difference. 
B. Models of Behavior: The Legal vs. The Attitudinal Models 
Empirical investigators of the law generally refer to two basic 
models of behavior that are used to formulate theory and think about 
how judges make decisions.22 The first and most basic conception is 
that judges make decisions based on the legal questions put before 
them.23 Known as the "legal model," this framework views judges 
15 !d. at 843--44, 866. 
16Jd. 
17 See generally Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory 
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (2004). 
18Jd 
19 !d. at 827. 
20 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. 
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa 
Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Prelimi-
nary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REv. 301, 322 (2004); Thomas J. Miles & Cass 
R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of 
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 847-65 (2006). 
21Jd 
22 Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REv. 841, 847--48 (2006). 
23 Id 
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as processors of information and logic with little to no regard for 
exogenous factors that might influence their decision.24 Under this 
model judges use traditional tools of legal analysis like precedent, 
statutory construction, original intent and legislative history to 
logically weigh the legal issue that is before them. 25 
Clearly, law matters. However, it would be na"ive to posit that 
a justice does not bring with her to the bench her own preferences 
for certain policy outcomes and her own political ideology. This 
brings us to the second basic model used by researchers, known as 
the "attitudinal model."26 This model of judicial behavior suggests 
24Jd 
zs Id 
26 For a brief discussion of the legal versus attitudinal model, see id (internal cita-
tions omitted). The authors state that 
political scientists speak of two basic models of judicial 
behavior: the legal model and the attitudinal model. As 
defined by political scientists, the legal model refers to 
traditional interpretive approaches familiar to lawyers, such 
as the language of legal texts (e.g., contracts, statutes, and 
constitutions), precedent, canons of construction, the intent of 
the framers, and legislative history. A common thread among 
these sources is that each is external to a judge's personal 
preferences or political views. The attitudinal model, on the 
other hand, is essentially the political science version of legal 
realism, where judges "decide[ ] disputes in light of the facts 
of the case vis-a-vis [their] ideological attitudes and values." 
While the legal model assumes an almost mechanical form of 
jurisprudence, the attitudinal model represents the opposite 
extreme, suggesting that ideology alone determines judicial 
outcomes. Indeed, the frequent protests of Supreme Court 
Judges that they do not or must not make policy are matched 
by some political scientists' complaints that legal arguments 
are deceptions. Standing alone, neither model captures what 
most legal scholars think influences judicial decisionmaking. 
Recently, political scientists have begun to give more attention 
to the legal model, and legal scholars have begun to give more 
empirical attention to the role of ideology. Nevertheless, much 
work remains to be done in developing and testing a model that 
incorporates ideological and legal influences. Both types of 
influences have strong backing in the theoretical literature on 
legal interpretation and deserve careful testing. 
!d. 
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that the legal analysis is not the only, nor necessarily the primary, 
determinant of decision-making.27 Rooted in the philosophy of 
pragmatism, this legal realist view looks at a judge's decision by 
asking about the judge herself or her relationship to other judges 
on bench, instead of strictly about the legal question that must 
be decided.28 Essentially, this model looks at how the judge's 
predisposed notions of policy preferences and political ideology 
influence her decision.29 
For example, researchers Miles and Sunstein have found 
that when conducting the Chevron analysis, the most conservative 
judges on the Supreme Court approve agency decisions at a lower 
rate when the President is a democrat as opposed to a republican. 30 
The same study also found that the liberal judges on the Court were 
more likely to approve agency decisions when there was a democrat 
in the White House.31 This pattern holds true for the courts of appeal 
as well.32 When liberal circuit court judges decide cases under the 
Chevron doctrine, they tend to approve those agency actions that 
were more liberal in nature, with conservatives voting in the same 
manner to promote their policy preferences.33 More recent analysis 
of environmental law has revealed that judges in fact may be using 
the Chevron analysis strategically in order to further their policy 
preferences. 34 
Another example comes from an analysis of all of the 
environmental law decisions coming before the D.C. Court of 
Appeals from 1970 to 1994.35 In this study by Richard Revesz,judicial 
27 Id 
28 Id 
29 Id 
30 Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Em-
pirical Investigation a/Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 at 826 (2004). 
31 Id 
32 !d. 
33Id. at 826-827. 
34 Jason Czarneski, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionsmaking, 
Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. 
Cow. L. REv. 767, at 820 ("The data provide very limited evidence that Chevron 
step one is used strategically to achieve desired policy preferences."). 
35 Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997). 
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collegiality was an important modifier of a justice's partisanship.36 
Revesz found that when judges of either party tended to work with 
at least one colleague of the same ideological bent, that those judges 
were more likely to reverse EPA decisions in an industry challenge 
if conservative, and affirm the EPA decision ifliberaP7 
More than likely, a combination of both conceptions of 
human nature explains judicial behavior; though neither model 
completely explains the calculus of judges, each is essential in 
developing testable hypotheses. This article draws upon both of 
these models to develop testable hypotheses. The main objective 
of this investigation was to uncover whether there are differences 
in the manner in which judges decide CAA versus CWA cases, not 
to compare or test these models of behavior. With that in mind, it is 
helpful to think ofboth of these models when developing hypotheses 
that test for differences in the statutes. 
C. Developing Hypotheses: The Clean Water Act and The 
Clean Air Act 
The CAA and the CWA were chosen for this analysis because 
they tend to be the two most litigated statutes in environmental law 
concerning agency review. 38 These two statutes were also the two 
statutes that offered enough observations to conduct a statistical 
analysis.39 Furthermore, each statute has received recent notoriety 
for potentially far reaching Supreme Court cases.40 The legal model 
suggests that there should be no difference between the CAA 
and the CWA.41 Since judges merely decide cases based on legal 
36 Id 
37 Id 
38 This should not be confused with the most litigated environmental statutes. Liti-
gation normally occurs on the lower district court level, not on the appellate level. 
The cases used here are only found on the appellate circuit court level. 
39 Generally, a statistical analysis requires at least n = 29 observations in order to 
satisfy the basic assumptions of regression estimation. The CAA and CWA were 
the only two statutes in this study that met this basic criteria. 
40 See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) for Clean Water Act and 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462--63 (2007) for the Clean Air Act. 
41 Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REv. 841, 847--48 (2006). 
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analysis, political ideology should not be a statistically significant 
predictor.42 On the other hand, the attitudinal model suggests that 
political ideology, along with judicial collegiality and political 
diversity, should play a part in both of the statutory contexts.43 The 
research design used in this study explicitly tested for evidence that 
judges' political attitudes drove their decisions regarding agency 
interpretation ofthe CAA and CWA. 
The following hypotheses were developed regarding judicial 
interpretation and agency review: 
Hypothesis 1: Political ideology will be a significant predictor of 
both CAA and CWA decisions, with conservative ideology being 
correlated with support of an agency decision and a liberal ideology 
being correlated with reversal of the agency decision. 44 
Hypothesis 2: Judicial collegiality will increase rates of partisanship, 
with conservatives more likely to affirm agency actions and liberals 
more likely to reverse agency actions. 
Hypothesis 3: Political diversity on a bench will increase the 
likelihood that a justice will reverse an agency action. 
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. The Courts, Judges and Cases 
Each appellate circuit court was included in this analysis 
except for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which did not have 
any cases of environmental statutory interpretation appealed to 
the circuit level. Figure 1 displays a comparison of the number of 
cases tried by each circuit court from 2003-2005. The D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals dominates in the number of cases tried during the 
three-year period sampled, with 108 judicial votes cast in statutory 
interpretation cases. One reason for its dominance is that some 
environmental law statutes require that any agency challenges be 
42 Id 
43 Id 
44 During the time period in question (2003-2005) the United States had a Repub-
lican President, George W. Bush. 
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brought before the D.C. circuit.45 The Ninth and Second Circuits had 
the second and third highest number of judicial votes with sixty-six 
and sixty-two, respectively.46 
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Number of Judicial Votes Cast Per Circuit 
Figure 1. 
The six votes cast in the Tenth Circuit involved CERCLA, and 
due to their nature involved no affirmation or reversal of agency action. 
Therefore, these six votes were dropped from the analysis, lowering 
the total number of votes from 347 to 341. 
The cases were chosen by conducting a search for all 
citations to the Chevron decision between 2003 and 2005. From 
this initial group of cases, all decisions that were decided en bane, 
amended later in the year, and cases whose primary question was 
not an interpretation of an environmental statute were deleted. After 
cutting out these cases, the data set was left with seventy cases, which 
45 See, e.g., Clean Air Act§ 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2011). 
46 The appendix contains a list of all of the judges whose votes were used in this 
analysis. Judges are listed according to the circuit on which they sit. 
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equated to 116 instances of environmental statutory interpretation 
and 34 7 judicial votes. These cases were reviewed by three judge 
panels that assessed agency action under the Chevron doctrine, and 
ultimately, whether to affirm or reverse such action. 
Table 1 contains a listing of all of the environmental statutes 
used in this analysis. By far, the CAA and the CWA are the dominant 
statutes being challenged and brought to the appellate level, with 
147 and seventy-two judicial votes respectively. The next two most 
frequently appealed statutes were the Organic Foods Production Act 
at the Energy Policy Act, with eighteen and fifteen judicial votes 
respectively. Most of these cases concern permitting actions by the 
EPA under the CAA and the Army Corps of Engineer under the 
CWA. 
Judicial 
Votes 
Federal Statute Cast 
Clean JIJr Act 14 7 
Clean Water Act 72 
Organic Foods Production Act 18 
Energy Policy Act 15 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Uability Act 9 
Safe Drinking Water Act 9 
National Wildlife Recovery Act 9 
Endangered Species Act 9 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and ManagemerJt Act 6 
National Hislnric Preservation Ad 6 
Resource Conservation & Recovery Act 6 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 3 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-«H<now Act 3 
Federal Power Act 3 
Federal Power Ad 3 
Dolphin Conservation Program Act 3 
National Environment Policy Act 3 
National Forest Management Act 3 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act 3 
Rivers & Harbors Act 3 
Sulface Mining Control & Redamation Act 3 
Food Security Act 3 
Wilderness Act 3 
NPS Organic Act 3 
National Arpliance Energy Conservation Act 2 
Tmal U7 
Table 1. 
Number of Judicial Votes Cast Per Environmental Statute 
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B. Methodology 
1. Dependent Variable 
A judge's vote to either reverse or affirm an agency action 
is the dependent variable in all of the regression estimations used 
in this analysis. Judicial votes were coded as a binomial (0, 1 ), with 
"0" indicating an agency reversal and "1" indicating an agency 
affirmation. Unlike prior assessments of judicial review of agency 
action, there is no coding for a liberal versus a conservative decision, 
or whether the action was pro-industry or pro-environment. For 
the purposes of this test of statutory context, the focus is only on 
reversing or affirming agency action. 
2. Ideology 
In order to code judges' political ideology, each judge's 
"common space score" under the Giles, Hettinger and Peppers' 
("GHP") formulation for ideology is used.47 As shown in Figure 2, 
this measure assigns a score to each judge who sits on a circuit court 
of appeals that varies from + 1 (the most conservative) to -1 (the 
most liberal). For each judge, Giles et al. assigns them one of two 
scores.48 
For judges nominated to sit in a state represented by 
a senator (or senators) of the president's party, the 
senator's common space score is used (or an average 
ifboth senators are of the president's party), reflecting 
the tradition of senatorial courtesy. If neither senator 
in office at the time of appointment is of the same 
party as the appointing president, then GHP assigns 
the judge the appointing president's score.49 
47 See generally Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking 
Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 PoL. REs. 
Q. 623 (2001). 
48 Id at 628. 
49 Jason Czarneski, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionsmaking, 
Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. 
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The validity of GHP scores as a measure of political ideology 
for judges has been proven to be effective. 50 
Common Space Scores for Judges (GHP) 
Most 
Liberal 
-1 • 
0 
I 
Figure 2. 
Most 
Conservative 
• +1 
A judge's GHP score can range from+ 1 (most conservative) 
to -1 (most liberal). 
Each judge in the data set was given a "GHP score" 
or a common space score in place of a label as a Republican or 
Democrat. Therefore, when referring to differences in political 
ideology throughout the article, references will be made to being 
more conservative or liberal depending on the GHP score a judge 
has been given. Figure 3 lists the average GHP scores for judges 
from the various federal circuits. The list to the left of the map 
indicates that the Ninth Circuit, which largely comprises the west 
coast, is the most liberal circuit as measured by the average GHP 
score for the judges sampled for this study. On the other end of 
the spectrum, the Fifth Circuit, which comprises Texas, Louisiana 
and Mississippi, is the most conservative circuit. Generally, these 
results intuitively make sense, with traditionally more conservative 
areas appointing conservative judges and liberal areas ofthe country 
appointing liberal judges. 
Cow. L. REv. 767, at 785-786. 
50 See, Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Com-
paring Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the US. 
Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. PoL. Scr. 123, 123-37 (2004). 
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Cin:uit Polilil:ai Ideology Scooo r<>r Cirwil 
1 0.(191 
2 -0.1168 
4 0.194 
5 0.261 
6 O.M1 
7 0.152 
8 -0.1311 
9 -0.166 
10 0.(135 
11 !!.1'56 
ll.C. 0.239 
Federal 0230 
Figure 3. 
Average Political Ideology Score Per Circuit Map. The figure shows the 
average political GHP score for each district using the individual judge's 
scores gathered in the sample of cases collected for this analysis. Since 
not all of the judges that sit on each circuit, nor all of the circuits, were 
sampled, a reader should not take these scores to reflect the actual and 
total average score for each circuit, but rather only for judges whose 
environmental administrative decisions were used in this analysis. 
3. Collegiality 
It has been said that there is strength in numbers. Judges 
are no exception. Collegiality has been found to be an important 
modifier of judicial decision making. 51 The presence of two judges 
of the same ideological disposition on a three judge panel tends to 
strongly reinforce the judges' ideological convictions.52 In order 
to operationalize this variable, judges were coded as having an 
51 LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS 117 (2005) (In implementing Chevron, "Republican circuit court 
judges sitting on panels with two other Republicans frequently voted to reverse 
liberal agency decisions but were less likely to vote to overturn them if a single 
Democrat served on the panel. Similarly, Democratic judges on panels with other 
Democrats frequently voted against conservative agency decisions but were less 
likely to reverse them if a Republican sat along with them."). 
52 Id For a focus on collegiality specific to an environmental law, see Richard 
L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. 
REv. 1717 (1997). 
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"ideological colleague" if there was at least one judge on the panel 
with a GHP score of the same sign as their ownY The result was a 
(0, 1) binomial variable. For example, if two conservatives were on 
the bench with one liberal, the conservatives (whose sign would be 
"+")would both receive a "1." Conversely, the liberal whose GHP 
score would be negative, would receive a "0." 
4. Political Diversity of the Bench 
In order to look at how diversity of political ideology on the 
bench might affect how a justice casts their vote to affirm or reverse 
an agency decision, a "political diversity" variable was developed 
that would measure the comparative amount of absolute difference 
between judges that comprise a bench decision. 
Where, 
The variable was computed using the following formula: 
y=la-bl 
z =Ia-~ 
x-lb-cl 
b=y+z+J 
3 
ya= Judge i's GHP score. 
zb = Judge ii's GHP score. 
xC= Judge iii's GHP Score. 
()6 =Political Diversity of Bench. 
For example, one of the CWA cases used in the analysis was 
the Rapanos Case from the Sixth Circuit.54 The appellate judges 
(and their corresponding GHP scores in parentheses) that decided 
the case for the Sixth Circuit were J. Reeves (y = 0.416), J. Gibbons 
53 This codification followed the same procedure used by Revesz in his earlier 
work. See, Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. 
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997). 
54 United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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(z = -0.142) and J. Siler (x = 0.358).55 J. Gibbons is more liberal at 
-0.142, then the largely conservative J. Reeves and J. Siler, who 
both score strongly to the right on the scale. The political diversity 
score for this bench is o = 0.372. This number is the average ofthe 
absolute difference on the GHP scale for each of the three judge pairs 
calculated using the formula above. This is a rather low political 
diversity number score, largely because the distance between J. 
Reeves and J. Siler is small, and J. Gibbons is not very far to the left. 
However, consider a case like Blue Water v. EPA from the D. C. 
Circuit. 56 The appellate judges in this case (and their corresponding 
GHP scores in parentheses) were J. Edwards (y = -0.51), J. Tatel 
(x = -0.456) and J. Sentelle (z = 0.568).57 Judge Sentelle is far right 
of Judges Edwards and Tatel, who are on the far left. The resulting 
political diversity score is o = 0.718, nearly double the score of 
the Rapanos case. Because there is one strong conservative and 
two strong liberals (as opposed to three judges who are closer to 
the center), there is a more diverse bench. This variable offers a 
comparative measure of the make-up ofthe bench. It does not code 
for being more liberal or more conservative; rather, it just looks at 
how ideological differences on a bench might affect outcomes. 
III. RESULTS 
The results are presented below in the order of the statistical 
analysis conducted. 
A. Descriptive Results: The CAA versus The CWA 
The first piece of evidence that there are basic differences 
between the way judges treat the CAA and the CWA can be seen by 
looking at the mean level of political ideology under each statute for 
those judges who reversed versus affirmed agency actions. Figure 
4 compares these numbers. It is revealing that the mean GHP score 
for CWA cases shows that those judges who affirmed tended to 
55 Id 
56 Blue Water Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
57 Id 
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be far more conservative. In contrast, those judges who reversed 
agency actions on statutory issues from the CWA tended to be far 
more liberal. This is not to say that there were no conservatives 
who reversed, or that there were no liberals who affirmed, but that 
the average GHP score was more conservative for affirmations and 
liberal for reversals. 
The CAA shows a somewhat similar trend, but not to the 
degree of the CWA cases. Those who affirmed EPA decisions under 
the CAA tended to be more conservative, while those who reversed 
tended to be more liberal. However, while the CWA cases show 
a space score difference of (.2252), the CAA cases only show a 
difference of(.036). The difference for CWAcases was nearly seven 
times greater. 
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Figure 4. 
A higher mean value indicates a more conservative than average judge. A 
lower mean value indicates a more liberal than average judge. 
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B. Regression Estimations 
1. Political Ideology Results 
Political ideology was the first variable tested through 
regression analysis. In order to control for differences that would 
be unique to each federal circuit, dummy variables were created for 
each federal circuit. 58 Equation 1 describes the regression estimation 
used here to test for the significance of political ideology in CAA 
versus CWA cases. The variables "CWAGHP" and "CAAGHP" are 
interaction terms, which combine the GHP score of the justice with 
whether or not they ruled on a CWA or CAA case. If the justice 
had ruled on either statute, then their GHP score was coded into the 
variable; for decisions that dealt with other environmental statutes, 
a "0" was given. 
Equation 1: 
Decision1 • ~CWA1 + PzCAA1 +~Year;+ 'l,t5"'CircuitCourtm1 
meM 
The original hypothesis was that political ideology would 
be a significant factor in both the CAA and CWA cases. The results 
of the regression presented in Table 2 indicate that the hypothesis 
was incorrect. As the previous comparison of means indicates, the 
political ideology of the judges who decided CWA cases was an 
important predictor in affirming or reversing an agency decision. 
The "CWAGHP" variable was positive and significant at the p<.10 
level, indicating that conservative judges tended to vote to affirm 
agency action in CWA cases and liberals tended to vote to reverse. 
However, there is no significance in CAA cases, indicating that 
conservatives and liberals did not tend to use their political ideology 
as a guide to decision making. 
58 However, the results of the regression coefficients for each circuit were not 
reported. 
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Binary Probit Regression- Dependent Variable: Decision 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z..Score p--value 
Constant 509.442 216.107 2.357 0.018 
CWAGHP 0.895 0.532 1.680 0.093 
CAAGHP 
-0.042 0.260 -0.163 0.870 
YEAR 
-0.254 0.108 -2.359 0.018 
Circuit Courts 
McFadden R-squ. .09 
N 341 
Obs with Dep=O 105 
Obs with Dep= 1 236 
Table 2. 
Dependent variable is binary (0, 1) variable. Reversal of agency decision 
was coded as "0". Affirmation of agency decision was coded as "1". 
The Eleventh Circuit was dropped to avoid a singular matrix in the 
regression and to provide a baseline analysis. The Third Circuit did not 
conduct a review of agency interpretation of a federal environmental 
statute during the period from 2003 to 2005. The Tenth Circuit's only 
review of agency interpretation of a federal environmental statute did not 
involve an affirmation or reversal decision; therefore, it was not included 
in estimation. Analysis was run onE-views software. 
2. Collegiality 
Conservative judges who decided CWA cases, as compared 
to other environmental statutory decisions, were significantly more 
likely than liberals to affirm the agency interpretation when there was 
another justice on the bench of the same political ideology. Table 3 
presents the results of the regression expressed in Equation 2. Notice 
that the "Judicial Colleague*CWAGHP" variable is significant at 
the p<.001 and is positive. Indeed, liberal judges who decided CAA 
cases were more likely than conservative judges to affirm the agency 
decision when there was another justice on the bench who was also 
liberal. This is shown by the Judicial Colleague*CAAGHP being 
significant at the p<.1 0 level and being negative. This means that 
when a negative GHP score multiplied by the Judicial Colleague 
dummy variable gave a value, those values tended to predict a 
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reversal at a significant level. 59 As in the previous regression model, 
circuit courts were controlled for in the estimation. 
Equation 2: 
Decision; • fi 1CWA; + ~ 2CAA; + fi1 Year; + ~4JudColl; + fl 5JudColl*CWAGHP; 
+ f'- 6JudColl*CAAGHP; + l£ll.,CircuitCourt,.; 
Biruuy Probit Regression- Dependent Variable: Decision 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z-Score p-value 
Constant 621.598 223.615 2.780 0.005 
CWAGHP 
-2.459 1.168 -2.105 0.035 
CAAGHP 0.666 0.477 1.398 0.162 
YEAR -0.311 0.112 -2.782 0.005 
Judicial Colleague 0.226 0.178 1.269 0.204 
Judicial 
Colleague*CWAGHP 4.725 1.420 3.326 0.001 
Judicial 
Colleague*CAAGHP 
-1.092 0.602 -1.815 0.070 
Circuit Courts 
McFadden R-squ. .13 
N 341 
Obs with Dep=O 105 
Obs with Dep= I 236 
Table 3. 
Dependent variable is a binary (0,1) variable. Reversal of agency 
decision was coded as "0". Affirmation of agency decision was coded 
as "l ". The Eleventh Circuit was dropped to avoid a singular matrix in 
the regression and to provide a baseline analysis. The Third Circuit did 
not conduct a review of agency interpretation of a federal environmental 
statute during the period from 2003 to 2005. The Tenth Circuit's only 
review of agency interpretation of a federal environmental statute did not 
involve an affirmation or reversal decision; therefore, it was not included 
in estimation. Analysis was run onE-views software. 
59 Before running this regression, another estimation was completed that looked 
at only whether the presence of a judicial colleague of the same ideology made a 
difference. However, no significance was found. 
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3. Collegiality in CWA versus CAA cases 
In order to look at only the effects of judicial collegiality 
and political ideology among each class of cases, regressions were 
run first using only the CWA cases and then only the CAA cases. 
Without doing these regressions, our results would only explain 
the significance of these variables in relation to all non-CWA and 
non-CAA cases, which were used as a baseline in the preceding 
regressions. Therefore, these regressions take out that comparison 
and look at the effects of the interaction term when comparing only 
CWA or only CAA cases to other votes cast for those specific cases. 
Equation 3: 
CWADecision1 - {J1GHJ: + fJ2JudCol4 + fJ3JudColi•GHP, + ~/.,CircuitCourt.u 
Binary Probit Regression- Dependent Variable: Decision 
Variables 
Constant 
GHP Score 
Judicial Colleague 
Judicial 
Colleague*GHP 
Score 
Circuit Courts 
B(Unstand) 
0.803 
-0.965 
0.015 
2.915 
McFadden R-squ. .14 
~ 72 
Obs with Dep=O 15 
Obf with Dep=l 57 
Table 4. 
S.E. Z-Score p-value 
0.402 1.999 0.046 
1.123 ..0.860 0.390 
0.454 0.033 0.974 
1.309 2.227 0.026 
Dependent variable is a binary (0, 1) variable. Reversal of agency 
decision was coded as "0". Affirmation of agency decision was coded 
as "1". The Eleventh Circuit was dropped to avoid a singular matrix in 
the regression and to provide a baseline analysis. The Third Circuit did 
not conduct a review of agency interpretation of a federal environmental 
statute during the period from 2003 to 2005. The Tenth Circuit's only 
review of agency interpretation of a Federal environmental statute did 
not involve an affirmation or reversal decision; therefore it was not 
included in estimation. Analysis was run on E-views software. 
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When looking at only CWA cases, conservatives are far more 
likely than liberals to affirm an agency interpretation of a statute when 
there is another conservative on the bench. Table 5 presents the results 
from the regression expressed in Equation 3. Note that the "Judicial 
Colleague*GHP Score" variable is significant at the p<.05 level and 
is positive. This indicates that, once again, conservatives were more 
likely to affirm agency actions when there was another conservative 
on the bench with them. However, in regard to CAA cases, there are no 
discemable differences from having a judicial colleague on the bench 
for either liberals or conservatives. Notice in Table 5 that the relevant 
variables are not significant predictors of the dependent variable. In 
other words, having a political colleague was not an important factor 
in CAA cases for either liberals or conservatives. 
Equation 4: 
CAADecision1 - P1GHF; + P2JudCol~ + P3JudColl* GHF; + ~/mCircuitCourtm1 
Binary Probit Regression- Dependent Variable: Decision 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z-Score p-value 
Constant 0.359 0.206 1.738 0.082 
GHP Score 0.331 0.447 0.742 0.458 
Judicial Colleague 0.259 0.245 1.060 0.289 
Judicial 
Colleague*GHP Score -0.342 0.534 -0.640 0.522 
Circuit Courts 
McFadden R-squ. .01 
N 147 
Obs with Dep=O 43 
Obs with Dep=l 104 
Table 5. 
Dependent variable is a binary (0,1) variable. Reversal of agency decision was 
coded as "0" .Affirmation of agency decision was coded as" 1". The Eleventh Circuit 
was dropped to avoid a singular matrix in the regression and provide a baseline 
analysis. The Third Circuit did not conduct a review of agency interpretation of 
a federal environmental statute during the period from 2003 to 2005. The Tenth 
Circuit's only review of agency interpretation of a federal environmental statute 
did not involve an affirmation or reversal decision; therefore, it was not included 
in estimation. Analysis was run onE-views software. 
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4. Political Diversity of Bench 
The following regression looks at how diversity of political 
ideology on the bench might affect how a justice casts their vote 
to affirm or reverse an agency decision. Diversity of political 
ideology is the average absolute difference in GHP scores of the 
judges on each bench. When looking at this explanatory variable, 
various independent variables were also used in the regression in 
order to control for potential factors that might influence the judges' 
decisions. Equation 5 describes the regression estimation and the 
interaction terms created to test how political diversity might affect 
decisions made concerning the CWA and the CAA, as well as when 
another justice on the bench is of the same political ideology. Once 
again, the regression controlled for the circuit court in which the 
decision was made. 
Table 6 displays the results. Notice that in this regression the 
CWA *Political Diversity variable is significant at the p <.05 and is 
negative. This indicates that in CWA decisions, more ideological 
diversity on a bench led to a significantly higher likelihood that 
the judges would reverse the agency decision. However, this 
effect is absent in the CAA *Political Diversity interaction term. 
Furthermore, there was no statistical significance for the Political 
Diversity* Judicial Colleague interaction term. 
Equation 5: 
Decision, .. {J1CWA, + P2CAA1 +Plea~+ {J4JudCol( + P5POLDJV, + {J6GHPSCORF; 
+ P7CWA * POWIV, + {J8CAA * POWIV, + {J9POLDIV* JudColl+ lt,6.,CircuitCourt.,, 
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Binary Probit Regression- Dependent Variable: Decision 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. 
Constant 
CWA 
CAA 
YEAR 
Judicial Colleague 
Political Diversity 
OHP Score 
CW A *Political 
Diversity 
CAA *Political 
Diversity 
Political 
Diversity* Judicial 
Colleague 
Circuit Courts 
443.1865 
2.034118 
0.539536 
-0.221048 
0.184030 
0.050072 
0.366068 
-2.777409 
-0.697167 
-0.113191 
McFadden R-squ. .06 
N 341 
Obs with Dep=O 105 
Obs with Dep=l 236 
212.8843 
0.755722 
0.373156 
0.106191 
0.391835 
0.767301 
0.174520 
1.288810 
0.717786 
0.752645 
Table 6. 
Z-Score 
2.081818 
2.691623 
1.445871 
-2.081612 
0.469662 
0.065258 
2.097574 
-2.155019 
-0.971275 
-0.150392 
p-value 
0.0374 
0.0071 
0.1482 
0.0374 
0.6386 
0.9480 
0.0359 
0.0312 
0.3314 
0.8805 
Dependent variable is a binary (0, 1) variable. Reversal of agency decision 
was coded as "0". Affirmation of agency decision was coded as "1 ". The 
Eleventh Circuit was dropped to avoid a singular matrix in the regression 
and to provide a baseline analysis. Analysis was run onE-views. 
IV. DISCUSSION: WHY THE DIFFERENCE? 
The results presented above show that there are real 
differences between the way judges treat CAA and CWA decisions 
concerning agency action. In short, this empirical analysis shows that 
statutory context does matter in environmental law. However, there 
is no clear reason why this might be. In what follows, some potential 
explanations are explored as to why CWA decisions seemingly are 
more political in nature as compared to CAA decisions. 
A. The Clean Water Act Allows More Political Interpretation 
One possible explanation could be that there was more 
confusion in CWAjurisprudence between 2003 and 2005, when the 
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cases used in this study were decided. Theoretically, unsettled points 
of statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court could open up the 
door for appellate courts to apply their own policy preferences with 
less fear that their decision would be overturned. The CWA cases 
analyzed here followed the Supreme Court's important decision 
in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of 
Engineers, but were before the Court clarified its position in the 
Rapanos v. US. decision in 2006.60 
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County 
("SWANCC'), the Supreme Court reversed an agency decision that 
for the first time put limits on the scope of CWA jurisdiction.61 In 
the decision the Court struck down the Migratory Bird Rule, which 
gave the Army Corps of Engineers ("ACE") jurisdiction over 
isolated wetlands that were inhabited by migratory birds.62 The ACE 
reasoned that migratory birds crossed state lines and accounted 
for over a billion dollars in annual expenditures by American 
consumers who were hunters or bird watchers.63 Therefore, the ACE 
concluded that any ponds used by the birds in interstate travel had 
a substantial affect on interstate commerce and were covered by the 
Clean Water Act. 64 However, the Court decided that the Migratory 
Bird Rule unconstitutionally provided jurisdiction over bodies of 
water whose relationship was too attenuated to interstate commerce, 
the constitutional hook upon which the ACE placed its power to 
regulate.65 Since the bodies of water were neither adjacent nor had 
any significant nexus with navigable waters, they were not covered 
by § 404 of the Clean Water Act. 66 
By striking down the migratory bird rule, the Court opened 
up the possibility that it would entertain other challenges to the 
60 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004). 
Indeed, when the Rapanos case was at the appellate level, it was used in this 
analysis. 
61 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 
159 (2001). 
62 !d. 
63 Id 
64Jd 
6s Id 
66 Id 
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CWA. Under this ruling, appellate judges might have been more 
encouraged to rule based on their policy preferences. However, this 
does not seem to fit with the circumstances found in this analysis. 
First, it was liberal judges who were more likely to reverse an 
agency decision in the CWA cases, not conservative judges. If any 
confusion surrounding the SWANCC decision was causing more 
agency reversals, one might expect it to come from conservative 
judges who would have held beliefs similar to those of Justice 
Rhenquist, who authored the majority opinion in SWANCC.67 On 
the contrary, liberal judges who were reversing agency decisions 
in this study probably would have been more likely to support a 
broad reading of the CWA to include as much ofthe nation's waters 
as possible. For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the SWANCC 
decision may have led to the phenomenon found, i.e., liberal reversal 
of agency decisions. 
B. The Clean Air Act is More Complex 
Another possibility stems from the actual language and 
structure of each statute. Could it be that that the CAA is more 
complex than the CWA? If it was relatively more complex, this 
complexity could drive judges to defer to the expertise of the EPA 
under the Chevron doctrine. In effect, this argument suggests that 
statutory complexity trumps political ideology, in that judges will 
merely defer to the agency and not apply their own policy preferences 
when they don not fully comprehend the statutory setup. 
This reasoning too does not make sense in light of the 
findings. If statutory complexity were truly causing the bench to 
defer to the agency, then one would expect there to be more instances 
of agency affirmations in the CAA than in the CWA. However, in 
this study the opposite is true. Judges deferred to the EPA in CAA 
cases a total of 104 out of 14 7 judicial votes, or 70% of the time. 
In CWA cases judges deferred to the agency in 57 out of 72 judicial 
votes, or 79% of the time. Therefore, it would seem that statutory 
complexity is not the answer. 
67 Id 
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C. Institutional Differences: The Army Corps of Engineers vs. 
the EPA 
The third possible explanation could involve the agency that 
the judges were reversing or affirming. In cases involvingjurisdiction 
of wetlands under the CWA, the Army Corps of Engineers was the 
agency involved.68 The Environmental Protection Agency handles 
the implementation of the CAA. The findings indicate that it may 
have been liberal judges who were reversing agency actions by 
the Army Corps of Engineers in CWA cases. Since the agencies in 
question fell under the executive branch at a time when there was 
a republican president, it could be that these liberal judges were 
enacting their policy preferences by opposing what they saw as 
conservative agency decisions regarding interpretation of the CWA. 
Indeed, previous studies have suggested that judges who are 
more liberal tend to reverse agency actions at a higher rate when 
there is a sitting president who is a republican.69 Unfortunately, 
this explanation does not shed light on why this trend is absent in 
the CAA cases. However, there are no indications that this is not 
what was occurring. Indeed, recall that the average GHP Score for 
judges reversing CAA cases was relatively more liberal than those 
who were affirming. These facts do tend to support the hypothesis 
that liberal judges were enacting their policy preferences. While it 
cannot be certain, this explanation offers another way to understand 
the results uncovered in this empirical analysis. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
This investigation looked at the differences of statutory 
context in environmental law. Specifically, this article examined the 
CWA and CAA to find out if there were differences in the manner 
68 Section 404 of the CWA designates the Secretary of the U.S. Army Corp of En-
gineers as the permitting authority for discharge of dredge or fill in the navigable 
waters of the United States, including wetlands that fall within this definition. See 
33 U.S.C. § 404 (2011). 
69 Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Em-
pirical Investigation a/Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 at 826 (2004). 
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in which judges decided to affirm or reverse agency action. First, 
political ideology was found to be an important factor in CWAcases 
as opposed to CAA cases and other less litigated environmental 
statutes. Specifically, in the CWA cases liberals were much more 
likely to reverse agency action as compared to conservatives. 
Another important set of findings concerns statutory context and 
judicial collegiality. In CWA cases, conservatives were much more 
likely to affirm when there was another conservative on the bench 
with them; both as compared to other environmental law statutes 
and when compared against only CWA cases. Conversely, in CAA 
opinions liberals were more likely to reverse agency rulings when 
there was another liberal on the bench with them. However, unlike 
the CWA cases, this effect was not significant when an independent 
estimation of only CAA cases was used. Finally, this article also 
examined the manner in which political diversity of a bench affects 
agency review and statutory context. Analysis of the data shows that 
in CWA decisions more political ideological diversity on a bench led 
to a significantly higher likelihood that the judges would reverse the 
agency decision. This trend was absent among CAA cases. These 
findings suggest that there are major differences in the manner in 
which judges approach the CWA as compared to the CAA. 
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Circuit Judae GHP Circuit Judae GHP 
Boudin 0.546 5 Davis 0.568 
Coffin -0.39 5 Dennis -0.079 
1 Howard 0.496 5 Garwood 0.468 
1 Lipez -0.456 5 Garza 0.547 
1 Lynch -0.44 5 Higginbotham 0.468 
1 Schwarzer 0.409 5 Restani 0.567 
1 Selya -0.009 5 Smith 0.547 
1 Torruella 0.568 5 Stewart -0.359 
2 Calabresi -0.283 6 Batcholder 0.546 
2 Carddamone 0.150 6 Boggs 0.358 
2 Jacobs 0.15 6 Clay -0.409 
2 Katzmann -0.363 6 Cole -0.291 
2 Kearse -0.359 6 Daughtrey -0.264 
2 Oakes 0.061 6 Forrester 0.327 
2 Parker, F. -0.390 6 Gibbons -0.142 
2 Parker, B.D. 0.538 6 Guy 0.568 
2 Pooler -0.359 6 Gwin -0.281 
2 Sotomayor -0.359 6 Moore -0.291 
2 Straub -0.359 6 Reeves 0.416 
2 Walker 0.150 6 Siler 0.358 
2 Wesley 0.538 6 Suhreheinrich -0.359 
4 Conrad 0.538 7 Bauer -0.026 
4 Gibbon Motz -0.414 7 Easterbrook 0.568 
4 Hamilton 0.417 7 Kanne 0.369 
4 Luttig 0.259 7 Manion 0.369 
4 Michael -0.260 7 Rovner 0.546 
4 Niemeyer 0.546 7 Williams -0.345 
4 Wilkinson 0.269 7 Wood -0.416 
5 Barksdale 0.334 8 Bye -0.247 
5 Benavides -0.456 8 Heaney -0.461 
Appendix 1. 
Judicial GHP Scores for Judges Casting Votes 
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Circuit Judge GHP Circuit Judge GHP 
8 Mel loy 0.294 10 Briscoe -0.456 
9 Alarcon -0.443 10 Ebel 0.517 
9 Bea 0.538 10 Hartz 0.538 
9 Berzon -0.361 10 Henry -0.044 
9 Browning -0.406 10 Shadur -0.382 
9 Brunetti 0.478 11 Anderson 0.012 
9 Bybee 0.538 11 Barkett -0.227 
9 Canby -0.138 11 Games 0.546 
9 Clifton 0.538 11 Forrester 0.327 
9 Nelson -0.443 11 Kravitch 0.012 
9 Duffy -0.223 11 Marcus -0.227 
9 Fisher -0.361 11 Tjoflat 0.358 
9 Fletcher, B. -0.347 11 Wilson 0.525 
9 Fletcher, W. -0.361 DC Brown 0.538 
9 Gibson 0.137 DC Edwards -0.51 
9 Gould -0.373 DC Garland -0.456 
9 Graber -0.329 DC Ginsburg 0.568 
9 Hawkins -0.138 DC Henderson 0.546 
9 Hug -0.148 DC Randolph 0.546 
9 McKay -0.51 DC Roberts 0.538 
9 McKeown -0.373 DC Rogers -0.456 
9 O'Scannlain -0.02 DC Senlelle 0.568 
9 Pregerson -0.443 DC Silberman 0.568 
9 Reinhardt -0.443 DC Tatel -0.456 
9 Schroeder -0.138 DC Williams 0.568 
9 Tallman -0.373 Federal Lourie 0.525 
9 Thomas -0.456 Federal Newman -0.359 
9 Thompson 0.31 Federal Schall 0.525 
9 Wardlaw -0.361 
Appendix2. 
Judicial GHP Scores for Judges Casting Votes 
